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The European Court of Human Rights has, in specific circumstances, interpreted the Convention
in a manner that extends the protection provided under civil and political rights into the socio-
economic sphere. Additionally, in obiter statements, the Court has alluded to the possibility that ‘a
wholly insufficient amount of pensions and other benefits’ would ‘in principle’ violate the
Convention, namely Articles 2, 3 and 1 Protocol 1 ECHR. This statement also appears in
recent admissibility decisions where applicants unsuccessfully challenged austerity measures adopted
to give effect to conditionality agreements in states facing a debt crisis. The article examines whether
with this statement the Court is suggesting that states must adhere to a minimum threshold of
welfare protection, thereby protecting all individuals in their jurisdiction from the destitution that
may arise from austerity policies. The article concludes that the Court’s approach in cases where
welfare reductions are under scrutiny points more towards a comparative or relative approach, an
approach that compares the position of the applicant to others within the respondent state, rather
than one that determines a welfare minimum in absolute and objective terms. Nonetheless, the
article argues that this statement on insufficiency of benefits has the potential of contributing to a
more substantively fair distribution of the cost of austerity in states facing a debt crisis.
Keywords: European Convention on Human Rights, welfare state, destitution,
austerity.
1 INTRODUCTION
In response to the sovereign debt crisis,1 affected states in Europe have implemen-
ted a series of stark austerity measures that have impacted all aspects of social
welfare.2 For states in southern Europe, austerity policies were adopted to give
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1 See indicatively The Sovereign Debt Crisis, the EU and Welfare State Reform (Caroline De La Porte & Elke
Heins eds, Palgrave Macmillan 2016); Too Little, Too Late: The Quest to Resolve Sovereign Debt Crises
(Martin Guzman, José Antonio Ocampo & Joseph E. Stiglitz eds, Columbia University Press 2016).
2 For an in-depth account of austerity measures across Europe see Social Rights in Times of Crisis in the
Eurozone: The Role of Fundamental Rights’ Challenges, EUI Working Papers (Claire Kilpatrick & Bruno
De Witte eds 2014–2015).
effect to conditionality agreements that sought to make the reduction of welfare
spending a prerequisite for access to financial support.3 With European countries
now operating under a balanced budget rule,4 there is renewed interest surround-
ing the precise scope of states’ obligations to maintain a well-functioning social
security and social welfare system.
The economic dimension of rights, especially of those rights whose realization
is highly resource-dependent, raises questions on the appropriate role of human
rights law in times of economic crisis.5 Academic discussion has revolved around
two interlinked issues. Firstly, how does a far-reaching debt crisis affect state
obligations under human rights law,6 and secondly, how should international
human rights protection mechanisms respond to the crisis?7
The approach of the European Court of Human Rights (henceforth, ‘the Court’
or ECtHR) to both these questions will be the focal point of this article. Applications
to the ECtHR challenging austerity measures have been largely unsuccessful, with
most failing at the admissibility stage. With its admissibility decisions and judgments,
the Court affirmed that domestic authorities are better placed, given the exceptional
circumstances of the debt crisis, to determine how their scarce resources will be
allocated while attempting to build a path to economic recovery.8 Thus, the pre-
sumption is that the state will enjoy the widest margin of appreciation possible in
relation to legislative measures taken to respond to a budgetary crisis.
However, the wide margin of appreciation the Court grants the respondent state
is accompanied by a warning that, in one form or another, has consistently appeared in
3 See for instance Antonia Baraggia, Conditionality Measures Within the Euro Area Crisis: A Challenge to the
Democratic Principle?, 4 Cambridge J. Int’l & Comp. L. 268–288 (2015); Pablo Martín Rodríguez, A
Missing Piece of European Emergency Law: Legal Certainty and Individuals’ Expectations in the EU Response
to the Crisis, 12 Eur. Const. L. Rev. 265–293 (2016).
4 See Tony Prosser, Constitutionalising Austerity in Europe, Pub. L. 111–129 (2016).
5 See indicatively Margot E. Salomon, Of Austerity, Human Rights and International Institutions, 21
Eur. L.J. 521–545 (2015); Lorenza Mola, The Margin of Appreciation Accorded to States in Times of
Economic Crisis, 5 Revista Jurídica de los Derechos Sociales 174–194 (2015); Ioanna Pervou,
Human Rights in Times of Crisis: The Greek Cases Before the ECtHR, or the Polaristation of a
Democratic Society, 5 Cambridge J. Int’l & Comp. L. 113–138 (2016).
6 Aoife Nolan, Not Fit for Purpose? Human Rights in Times of Financial and Economic Crisis, 4 Eur. Human
Rts. L. Rev. 358–369 (2015); Economic and Social Rights After the Global Financial Crisis (Aoife Nolan
ed., Cambridge University Press 2014); Lutz Oette, Austerity and the Limits of Policy-Induced Suffering:
What Role for the Prohibition of Torture and Other Ill-Treatment?, 15 Human Rts. L. Rev. 669–694
(2015); Janneke Gerards, The ECtHR’s Response to Fundamental Rights Issues Related to Financial and
Economic Difficulties – The Problem of Compartmentalisation, Neth. Q. Human Rts. 274–292 (2015);
Stamatina Yannakourou, Austerity Measures Reducing Wage and Labour Costs Before the Greek Courts: A
Case Law Analysis, 11 Irish Emp. L.J. 36–43 (2014).
7 Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos, The European Court of Human Rights at a Time of Crisis in Europe, 2 Eur.
Human Rts. L. Rev. 121–135 (2016); Ben T. C. Warwick, Socio-Economic Rights During Economic
Crises: A Changed Approach to Non-Retrogression, 65 Int’l & Comp. L. Q. 249–265 (2016); Joe Wills &
Ben T. C. Warwick, Contesting Austerity: The Potential and Pitfalls of Socioeconomic Rights Discourse, 23
Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 629–664 (2016).
8 The cases are developed in detail in the body of the article.
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the Court’s austerity case law. The Court cautions the respondent states that it would
be willing to find a violation of the Convention9 where the pension or other benefits
the applicant received from the state are found to be ‘wholly insufficient’,10 or where a
reduction of benefits would result in the applicant falling below the ‘subsistence
threshold’.11 The Court has not defined the threshold beneath which social provisions
would be deemed insufficient or threaten the applicant’s subsistence,12 nor has it found
a violation of the Convention relying exclusively on the insufficiency (or complete lack
of) a benefit.13 This has led commentators to suggest that such statements are nothing
more than a rhetorical device, a ‘teasing promise’14 which the Court deploys obiter,15
but is unlikely to fulfil.
The fact that the Court returns to this concept, however, raises a series of
questions that require further academic analysis to complement existing scholarship
on the socio-economic jurisprudence of the ECtHR. What does this statement on
insufficiency suggest about the Court’s understanding of its role in supervising the
implementation of the Convention in the midst of a debt crisis? Can such obiter
statements be relied upon to ensure that austerity policies do not reach a point of
condemning individuals to destitution? And, finally, is the Court through these
statements incrementally generating an obligation on states to provide an objective
minimum of social welfare, a ‘social minimum’16 that would serve as a
Convention-based safety net which austerity could not penetrate?
9 As will be discussed below, the Court has alluded to the possibility that a completely insufficient
amount of social benefits could violate Arts 2, 3 and Art. 1 Protocol 1 ECHR.
10 As the article will demonstrate, the Court uses this terminology in Art. 3 cases. See indicatively Budina
v. Russia Application No. 45603/05, decision on admissibility, 18 June 2009.
11 This phraseology is used in Art. 1 P1 cases.
12 Jo Kenny, European Convention on Human Rights and Social Welfare, 5 Eur. Human Rts. L. Rev. 495,
501 (2010).
13 As will be demonstrated below, the Court when finding that an austerity measure violated the
Convention, relied on other factors in combination with ‘insufficiency’ to find a violation.
14 Colm O’Cinneide, A Modest Proposal: Destitution, State Responsibility and the European Convention on
Human Rights, 5 Eur. Human Rts. L. Rev. 583, 590 (2008).
15 As Feldman explains ‘There is no real distinction drawn by the Court between ratio decidendi and
obiter dictum in its previous pronouncements [ … ] All statements are regarded as sources of
enlightenment as to the meaning of the ECHR’. ‘Precedent and the European Court of Human
Rights’, in Appendix C to Law Commission Consultation Paper No. 157, Criminal Law: Bail and the
Human Rights Act 1998: A Consultation Paper 114–115 (1999), cited by Alastair Mowbray, An
Examination of the European Court of Human Rights’ Approach to Overruling its Previous Case Law, 9
Human Rts. L. Rev. 179–201 (2009).
16 Waldron defines a social minimum as ‘a level of material well-being beneath which no-one should be
permitted to fall’ in Jeremy Waldron, John Rawls and the Social Minimum, 1 J. Applied Phil. 21 (1986).
See also Juri Viehoff, Maximum Convergence on a Just Minimum: A Pluralist Justification for European Social
Policy, 15 Eur. J. Pol. Theory 164–187 (2017). On a ‘minimum core approach’, see Ingrid Leijten,
From Stec to Valkov: Possessions and Margins in the Social Security Case Law of the European Court of
Human Rights, 13 Human Rts L. Rev. 309–350 (2013) and Ingrid Leijten The German Right to an
Existenzminimum, Human Dignity, and the Possibility of Minimum Core Socioeconomic Rights Protection, 16
Ger. L.J. 23–48 (2015).
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By analysing the Court’s austerity case-law, this article reaches the following
conclusions. In Part 2, the article demonstrates that in cases where applicants
challenged reductions to their welfare under Article 1 Protocol 1, the Court relied
on the insufficiency of a benefit as a justification to override the wide margin of
appreciation and to proceed to a more rigorous scrutiny of the impugned austerity
measure. The fact that the reduction may threaten the applicant’s subsistence,
however, served merely as a starting point in the Court’s analysis. In the few
cases where an austerity measure was found to be disproportionate due to its
insufficiency, the central element the Court relied on was not the overall amount
of the benefit, but the fact that the applicant had been singled out to carry the
burden of austerity when compared to others within the respondent state.
Conversely, where the applicant could not demonstrate that their welfare reduc-
tions were excessive compared to others, no violation was found. In these cases,
the Court does not specify the content of a minimum threshold of welfare
protection or a maximum of permissible austerity cuts to welfare. Instead, the
Court determines the outcome of the case by employing a comparative or relative
approach.
However, if austerity measures are distributed without targeting specific classes
of individuals within the respondent state, do references to insufficiency of benefits
or subsistence thresholds leave open the possibility for a successful challenge to an
austerity measure that renders an individual destitute? This relates to a broader issue
that has generated significant academic discussion.17 To what extent can the
ECHR, which primarily protects civil and political rights, be utilized as a means
to protect individuals from destitution? The Court has addressed such instances of
destitution namely by reference to Articles 2 and 3 ECHR. As the article will
explain in Part 3, the Court has on occasion found a state in violation of Article 3
for failing to provide material assistance to individuals, by relying on their vulner-
able status.18 This approach, however, also contains a comparative or relative
element. What the Court is suggesting in such cases, is that the applicant is
vulnerable in comparison to others within the respondent state. This is then used
as the justification for the Court to expand the positive obligations of states under
the Convention towards the applicants and to require them to take supplementary
17 Indicatively Ellie Palmer, Beyond Arbitrary Interference: The Right to a Home? Developing Socio-economic
Duties in the European Court of Human Rights, 61 N. Ir. Legal Q. 225–243 (2010); Françoise Tulkens,
The Contribution of the European Convention on Human Rights to the Poverty Issue in Times of Crisis, 2
Cyprus Human Rts. L. Rev. 122–140 (2013); Laurens Lavrysen, Strengthening the Protection of Human
Rights of Persons Living in Poverty Under the ECHR, 33 Neth. Q. Human Rts. 293–325 (2015); Ida
Koch, Human Rights as Indivisible Rights: The Protection of Socio-Economic Demands Under the European
Convention on Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2009).
18 See MSS v. Belgium and Greece Application No 30696/09, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 21 Jan. 2011 and
VM and others v. Belgium Application No 60125/11, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 7 July 2015.
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socioeconomic measures. In light of this, the article will argue in Part 4, that while
the statement on insufficiency of benefits, should not be understood as generating
an objective minimum of Convention-protected socio-economic obligations, the
Court’s repeated reference to it is useful. This is due to the fact that this statement
has the potential of contributing to a more substantively fair distribution of the cost
of austerity in states facing a debt crisis.
In the final section, the article will assess what best explains the Court’s
preference for a comparative or relative approach, over an approach that identifies
a concrete and absolute, pan-European social minimum. The article will conclude
that this approach strikes a good balance in allowing the Court to provide some
oversight to the implementation of austerity, while also ensuring that it does not
expand state obligations under the Convention into the socio-economic sphere in
a manner that states may consider illegitimate.
2 APPLICATIONS BROUGHT UNDER ARTICLE 1 PROTOCOL 1
AND THE ‘SUBSISTENCE THRESHOLD’
Before proceeding with the analysis of the Court’s approach to austerity claims
brought under the right to property, a preliminary point must be addressed. This
relates to the Court’s capacity to adjudicate on socio-economic matters. The rights
emanating from the welfare state are socio-economic in nature. The fact that the
Convention is primarily aimed towards the protection of civil and political rights19
has not limited the Court from embracing the concept that rights are indivisible,
interrelated and interdependent.20 The Court has accepted on many occasions that
there is no watertight distinction between the two sets of rights,21 and has main-
tained that ‘the mere fact that an interpretation of the Convention may extend into
the sphere of social and economic rights should not be a decisive factor against
such an interpretation’.22 In practice, however, the Court has demonstrated a great
degree of restraint when examining cases that relate to the formulation of the
19 The Convention protects some rights that are traditionally associated with the economic, social and
cultural rights canon, such as the right to education under Art. 2 of Protocol 1 ECHR. See also
Bernadette Rainey, Elizabeth Wicks & Clare Ovey, Jacobs, White and Ovey: The European Convention
on Human Rights Ch. 9 (Oxford University Press 2014).
20 Reflecting the approach in the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, Adopted by the World
Conference on Human Rights in Vienna on 25 June 1993 at para. 5.
21 See for instance Airey v. Ireland Application No 6289/73, Merits, 9 Oct. 1979 at para. 26, Ν. v. United
Kingdom Application No 26565/05, Merits, 27 May 2008 and more recently Asiye Genç v. Turkey
Application No 24109/07, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 27 Jan. 2015 and note the concurring opinion
of judges Lemmens, Spano and Kjolbro.
22 Budina v. Russia supra n. 10; Marc Bossuyt, Should the Strasbourg Court Exercise More Self-restraint? On the
Extension of the Jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights to Social Security Regulations, 28 Human
Rts. L.J. 321 (2007).
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respondent state’s welfare policy, especially where such policies involve the alloca-
tion of scarce resources. The consistent approach of the Court has been to grant
the respondent state a wide margin of appreciation, especially where applicants rely
on the Convention to assert that the respondent state has a positive obligation to
provide them with material assistance or a benefit.23
A useful starting point to illustrate more precisely how the Court purports to
determine state obligations under the Convention in relation to social welfare and
Article 1 Protocol 1 (henceforth Article 1 P1) is the case of Stec and others v. United
Kingdom.24 The applicants sought to challenge the ‘differences in the entitlement
for men and women to certain industrial injuries social security benefits’.25 With
regard to state ‘social welfare’ obligations under the Convention, the Court in this
case reached three important conclusions. Firstly, the Court held that the
Convention does not create an obligation on Contracting Parties to establish a
social security scheme or to provide a minimum amount of benefits.26 Secondly,
the Court noted that if the state does establish such a scheme, the welfare provided
(pensions and benefits, both contributory and non-contributory) would fall under
Article1 P1, and are thus considered ‘possessions’ for the purposes of the
Convention. Thirdly, any welfare policies the state adopts must be organized in
a manner that is compatible with Article 14 ECHR.27
The second point in the Court’s analysis in Stec is most relevant to the
discussion here, as it suggests that the Convention’s guarantee for the peaceful
enjoyment of possessions28 would require the Court to engage in a ‘fair balancing’
assessment to determine whether any interference with existing welfare benefits
satisfied the conditions of proportionality. When such interference is the result of
austerity policies in states facing an acute financial crisis, it is to be expected that the
Court would grant the state a wide margin of appreciation.
The cases reaching the Court at the time of the debt crisis confirm this
account. The applicants in Koufaki and ADEDY v. Greece29 for instance, com-
plained about the cuts in their wages and pensions emanating from the laws
23 It is not uncommon for a case that requires substantial reallocation of resources to be declared inadmissible
as manifestly ill-founded. See for instance Botta v. Italy Application No 21439/93, Decision on the
Admissibility, 24 Feb. 1998; Zahnalova and Zehnal v. Czech Republic Application No 38621/97,
Decision on the Admissibility, 14 May 2002; Sentges v. Netherlands Application No 27677/02, Decision
on the Admissibility 8 July 2003.
24 Application Nos 65731/01 and 65900/01, Merits, 12 Apr. 2006. See also Valkov and Others v. Bulgaria
Application No 2033/04, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 25 Oct. 2011.
25 Legal summary of the case, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{“itemid”:[“002-3406”]} (accessed Aug. 1
2018).
26 Stec, supra n. 24, at para. 53.
27 See also Koua Poirrez v. France Application No 40892/98, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 30 Sept. 2003.
28 Protected under Art. 1 P1 ECHR.
29 Koufaki and Adedy v. Greece Application Nos 57665/12 and 57657/12, Decision on the Admissibility 7
May 2013.
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implementing the first agreement of financial support containing conditionality
between Greece and its foreign creditors. The case was found inadmissible as
manifestly ill-founded.30 The Court reiterated that, under the circumstances, a
wide margin of appreciation would apply.31 The Court also dismissed the appli-
cants’ arguments that there were less intrusive measures that Greece and its
creditors could have adopted in response to the debt crisis.32
In Da Conceicao Mateus and Santos Januario v. Portugal,33 another case that failed
at the admissibility stage, the Court found the cuts in the applicants’ pensions to be
‘clearly in the public interest within the meaning’34 of Article 1 P1 and confirmed
that ‘a wide margin of appreciation is usually allowed to the State under the
Convention when it comes to general measures of economic or social policy’.35
The Court reached similar conclusions in Silva Carvalho Rico v. Portugal,36
noting that the austerity measures in this case ‘were adopted against the back-
ground of an actual and unexpected budgetary crisis’.37 Notably, the Court also
made reference to the judgment of the Portuguese Constitutional Court on the
matter, which grounded its decisions on the ‘proviso of the possible’,38 a doctrine
according to which ‘a State cannot be forced to comply with its obligations in the
framework of social rights if it does not possess the economic means to do so’.39
Finally, in the more recent case of Mamatas and others v. Greece,40 the Court
emphasized that it has ‘built a jurisprudence on the margin of appreciation of States
in the context of the economic crisis in Europe since 2008 and particularly in
30 Ibid., at para. 49.
31 ‘As the decision to enact laws to balance State expenditure and revenue will commonly involve
consideration of political, economic and social issues, the Court considers that the national authorities
are in principle better placed than the international judge to choose the most appropriate means of
achieving this and will respect their judgment unless it is manifestly without reasonable foundation
[ … ]This margin is even wider when the issues involve an assessment of the priorities as to the
allocation of limited State resources’. Ibid., at para. 31.
32 Ibid., at para. 48. As the Court stressed:
‘As regards alternative solutions, their possible existence does not in itself render the contested
legislation unjustified. Provided that the legislature remains within the bounds of its margin of
appreciation, it is not for the Court to say whether the legislation represented the best solution for
dealing with the problem or whether the legislature’s discretion should have been exercised in another
way’.
33 Application Nos 62235/12 and 57725/12, Decision on Admissibility, 8 Oct. 2013.
34 Ibid., at para. 26.
35 Ibid., at para. 22.
36 Application Nos 13341/14, Decision on the Admissibility 1 Sept. 2015.
37 Ibid., at para. 44.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 Application Nos 63066/14, 64297/14 and 66106/14, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 21 July 2016.
Contrary to the cases mentioned above, this case was found to be admissible and the Court proceeded
to the examination of the merits.
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relation to austerity measures through legislation’.41 This reference to established
case law on the margin of appreciation suggests that the Court will examine such
cases under a rebuttable presumption of non-interference with legislative measures
that seek to balance the budget through the adoption of austerity measures.
The common thread in these admissibility decisions and the Mamatas judg-
ment, was the Court’s emphasis on the exceptional circumstances of the debt crisis
and the concomitant ‘light touch’ review it would conduct of the impugned
austerity measures.
While making reference to the broad discretion of the state, however, the
Court also issued a warning that purported to set the threshold beneath which
welfare provisions could not fall without violating Article 1 P1.
In Koufaki for instance, and in the context of Article 1 P1, the Court noted
that ‘that the applicants before it had not claimed specifically that their situation
had worsened to the extent that they risked falling below the subsistence threshold’.42
This suggests that if the applicant had been more adversely impacted by the
austerity measures, the Court’s position would have been different. This was
more explicitly stated in the Da Conceicao Mateus admissibility decision, where
the Court stressed that ‘a total deprivation of entitlements resulting in the loss of
means of subsistence would in principle amount to a violation of the right of
property’.43
This warning that cuts which threaten the applicant’s subsistence could violate
the Convention can be interpreted as clarifying to states that they do not benefit
from unlimited discretion when implementing austerity policies. These obiter
statements, however, raise an important question. If the Court is asserting that
cuts that result in someone falling below the subsistence threshold violate Article 1
P1, how is this threshold to be defined? As this part will demonstrate, while the
overall amount of a social benefit is a starting point for the Court to engage in a
more in-depth scrutiny of the impugned austerity measure, this is not the critical
factor it will rely on to find a violation. Instead, the Court analyses austerity
measures from the viewpoint of how the reduction the applicant faces compares
with similar reductions or the overall amount of pensions others receive in the
respondent state. Thus, rather than specifying the content of an absolute, pan-
European social minimum, or a maximum of acceptable welfare reductions, the
Court instead adopts a comparative or relative approach.
41 Ibid., at para. 88 and para. 120. See also Frimu and others v. Romania Application No 45312/11, Decision
on the Admissibility, 13 Nov. 2012; Panfile v. Romania Application No 13902/11, Decision on the
Admissibility, 20 Mar. 2012.
42 Koufaki, supra n. 29, at para. 44, emphasis added.
43 Da Conceicao Mateus, supra n. 33, at para. 24, emphasis added. The Court reached the same conclusion
in Silva Carvalho Rico, supra n. 36, at para. 42.
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The case of Kjartan Asmundsson v. Iceland44 serves to illustrate this point. The
applicant received a disability pension after sustaining serious injuries in a work
accident. As a response to the economic crisis in Iceland, the government removed
the disability pension entitlements in their entirety from specific classes of recipi-
ents, including the applicant. The Court’s approach, in finding a violation of
Article1 P1 is telling:
The vast majority of the 689 disability pensioners continued to receive disability benefits at
the same level as before the adoption of the new rules, whereas only a small minority of
disability pensioners had to bear the most drastic measure of all, namely the total loss of
their pension entitlements. [ … ] [T]he above differential treatment in itself suggests that
the impugned measure was unjustified [and] must carry great weight in the assessment of
the proportionality issue under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. [ … ] Against this background,
the Court finds that, as an individual, the applicant was made to bear an excessive and
disproportionate burden [ … ]. It would have been otherwise had the applicant been
obliged to endure a reasonable and commensurate reduction rather than the total depriva-
tion of his entitlements.45
The decisive factor that grants the Court the legitimacy to override the wide
margin of appreciation thus seems to stem not only from the reduction (or, in this
case, the complete deprivation) of the applicant’s pension, but from the ‘differential
treatment’ in which the austerity measures were designed. The Court did not rely
on Article 14 ECHR to reach this conclusion,46 but employed the term ‘discri-
mination’ to convey that the applicant was selected to bear the brunt of austerity,
while most in a similar position were left unaffected.47 This justified the Court’s
finding of an ‘excessive and disproportionate burden’48 on the applicant. Thus, the
deprivation the applicant faced, and this is crucial to the article’s argument, was not
the sole factor on which the Court relied. The Court did not find the state in
violation due to its failure to continue providing the applicant with x amount of
social welfare, but for failing to reduce benefits in response to the crisis in a
commensurate manner.
Similar justifications were employed by the Court in N.K.M v. Hungary,49
where the applicant complained under Article 1 P1, that that the 98% tax she was
44 Application Nos 60669/00, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 12 Oct. 2004. See also Bäck v. Finland
Application No 37598/97, Merits, 20 July 2004 where the Court found that the virtual extinction
of guarantor’s claim as a result of court-approved debt adjustment in the context of recession in
Finland did not violate Art. 1 P1.
45 Asmundson, supra n. 44, at paras 43–45, emphasis added.
46 Ibid., at para. 44. The Court, after finding a violation of Art. 1 P1, did not proceed to examine the Art.
14 claim separately.
47 The allusion to the discriminatory nature of the measure, without recourse to Art. 14 will be addressed
in the article’s final section.
48 Asmundson, supra n. 44, at paras 43–45.
49 N.K.M. v. Hungary Application No. 66529/11, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 14 May 2013.
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required to pay on the severance payment she received after being dismissed from
the Hungarian civil service was excessive and not reasonably connected to the aim
of ‘protecting the public purse’ in times of economic crisis.50 In its finding of a
violation, the Court was sympathetic to this claim, and once again drew its
conclusions after comparing the applicant’s position to that of other persons in
similar situations. The Court thus emphasized that:
[T]he measure targeted only a certain group of individuals, who were apparently singled
out by the public administration in its capacity as employer. Assuming that the impugned
measure served the interest of the State budget at a time of economic hardship, the Court
notes that the majority of citizens were not obliged to contribute, to a comparable extent,
to the public burden.51
This comparison between the position of the applicant and other classes of
individuals has also been employed by the Court as a basis to not find a violation,
where the applicant is in a similar position to other classes of individuals affected by
austerity cuts.52
In Savickas and others v. Lithuania53 for instance, where a senior judge com-
plained to the Court for the significant reduction in her pension, the Court once
again held that it was ‘decisive that the reduction of public sector salaries did not
single out the judiciary. On the contrary, the reduction of judges’ salaries formed
part of a much wider programme of austerity measures affecting salaries in the
entire public sector’.54 The Court also stressed that ‘it would be unfair for judges to
be treated as an exception and to be exempted from austerity measures’.55
This was further affirmed in Khoniakina v. Georgia56 which broadly shared the
same facts with the Savickas case. Here, the Court noted that an amendment to
legislation which resulted in reductions to the pensions of retired Supreme Court
judges:
[W]as not a single isolated statutory change but formed part of a much wider legislative
reform of the pension system for retired civil servants. [ … ] Consequently, it cannot be
50 Ingrid Leijten, N.K.M. v. Hungary: Heavy Tax Burden Makes Strasbourg Step In, http://strasbourgobser
vers.com/2013/06/10/n-k-m-v-hungary-heavy-tax-burden-makes-strasbourg-step-in/ (accessed 2
Apr. 2017).
51 N.K.M, supra n. 49, at para. 72. The Court as in the Asmundson case (supra n. 50) did not examine the
issue separately under Art. 14 ECHR.
52 Reference to this was also made in the admissibility decisions discussed above. In Silva Carvalho Rico
(supra n. 36) the Court noted that ‘the imposition of a reasonable and commensurate reduction’ to
benefits would not violate Art. 1 P1 at para. 42 emphasis added. The same statement appears verbatim
in Da Conceicao Mateus (supra n. 33) at para. 24.
53 Application No. 66365/09, Decision on the Admissibility, 15 Oct. 2013.
54 Ibid., at para. 93.
55 Ibid.
56 Application No. 17767/08, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 19 June 2012. See also Bakradze and others v.
Georgia Application Nos 1700/08, 22552/08 and 6705/09, Decision on the Admissibility, 8 Jan. 2013
at para. 20.
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said, [ … ] that the general reform of retired civil servants’ pension entitlements made the
applicant bear an individual and excessive burden as one of the small number of retired
judges of the Supreme Court.57
The comparison between the position of the applicant and others is even
more central in the case of Stefanetti and Others v. Italy.58 While the case does not
relate to austerity measures, it is highly relevant in illustrating the Court’s approach
when calculating whether a reduction in pension violates Article 1 P1. The
applicants who were Italian nationals, decided to retire in Italy after working
many years in Switzerland. Upon their return to Italy their pension claims were
readjusted to take into account the very low contributions they had paid while
working in Switzerland. This meant that they would stand to lose an estimated
67% of their pension. In finding a violation of Article 1 P1, the Court set out
important criteria for assessing whether such a measure would violate the
Convention. The starting point for the Court was that the reductions had
undoubtedly affected the applicants’ way of life and ‘hindered its enjoyment
substantially’.59 Secondly, the Court stressed that, ‘the fair balance test cannot be
based solely on the amount or percentage of the reduction suffered, in the abstract.
In all of these cases, and other similar ones, the Court endeavours to assess all the
relevant elements of the case against a specific background’.60 Once again, the
Court conducted a comparative exercise between the individuals and other pen-
sioners in Italy. Relying on statistics presented by the European Committee of
Social Rights, the Court examined the state of pensions in Italy and accordingly
assessed the overall amount the applicants would have received, finding Italy to be
in violation of Article 1 P1.61
In its broader pension case-law, the Court has also not found a violation of
Article 1 P1 where reductions in social welfare ‘were general measures intended to
undo special privileges or to bring special pension regimes into the general one’.62
Thus, reductions intending to bring groups enjoying better welfare treatment in
line with others do not violate the Convention.
57 Ibid., at para. 78.
58 Application Nos. 21838/10, 21849/10, 21852/10, 21855/10, 21860/10, 21863/10, 21869/10 and
21870/10, Merits, 15 Apr. 2014.
59 Ibid., at para. 64.
60 Ibid., at para. 59.
61 Another important element the Court took into account in this case was the legitimate expectation of
receiving higher pensions the applicants had when returning to Italy at para. 65. The frustration of
legitimate expectations was also relied on to find a violation of Art. 1 P1 in Béláné Nagy v. Hungary
Application No 53080/13, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 10 Feb. 2015. At the time of writing the case is
pending before the Grand Chamber following a referral.
62 Da Conceicao Mateus, supra n. 33, at para. 24. See also Maggio and Others v. Italy, nos. 46286/09, 52851/
08, 53727/08, 54486/08 and 56001/08, § 63, 31 May 2011.
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Therefore, it can be submitted that unless there is a manifestly unfair ‘dis-
tribution’ of austerity amongst various groups, where a specific group is called
upon to bear the brunt of cuts and reductions in line with the Asmundsson, N.K.M
and Stefanetti cases, the Court will maintain a deferential stance. It is interesting to
note that the critical element for the court to find a violation in these cases was not
the degree to which the social benefit was reduced or its overall amount,63 but the
‘specific background’ of the case, namely the position of the applicant in compar-
ison to others within the respondent state.
This seems to suggest that the amount of welfare is in essence a starting point
for the Court to proceed to more rigorous scrutiny of the impugned measure than
the traditional wide margin of appreciation would permit. In doing so, however,
the Court is not setting an objective, or an absolute, European-wide social mini-
mum. By comparing the position of the applicant to that of others in the
responding state, the Court is attempting to determine the subjective capabilities
of each state. Therefore, in these cases the Court adopts a comparative or relative
approach rather than one based on an absolute understanding of a social minimum.
In light of this, it would be useful to examine a further possibility. The
following section will seek to determine whether the Court’s statement on
insufficiency of benefits would be of any value in circumstances where the
distribution of the cost of austerity is fair, but certain individuals are con-
demned to destitution. Going beyond a comparative or relative approach, is
there any indication in the Court’s case-law that the ‘wholly insufficient’
construct could effectively establish an objective social minimum of welfare
protection? The Court has sought to address these issues by reference to
Articles 2 and 3 ECHR. Its approach in these cases will be analysed in the
section below.
3 APPLICATIONS BROUGHT UNDER ARTICLES 2 & 3 ECHR
The cases brought under Articles 2 and 3 ECHR have focused more on situations
where the applicants were seeking certain minimum benefits rather than protesting
their removal as in the Article 1 P1 cases discussed above.
The first case where the Court connected Convention rights to destitution
was Larioshina v. Russia,64 where the applicant complained about the very limited
sum she was given through her old-age pension and certain other social benefits
that she was entitled to. The Court found the case inadmissible but very
63 Although reference is made to this in all the judgments.
64 Application No 56869/00, Decision on the Admissibility, 23 Apr. 2002.
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importantly noted ‘that a complaint about a wholly insufficient amount of pension
and the other social benefits may, in principle, raise an issue under Article 3’.65
This position of the Court was further developed in the admissibility decision
in Budina v. Russia.66 The applicant received state benefits due to her disability.
When she reached retirement age, these were replaced with an ‘old-age’ pension.
The applicant argued under Article 2 ECHR, that the very small sum she was
receiving was inadequate for her survival. Although her claim was ultimately
unsuccessful, once again failing at the admissibility stage, the approach of the
Court is enlightening:
The Court cannot exclude that State responsibility could arise for “treatment” where an
applicant, in circumstances wholly dependent on State support, found herself faced with
official indifference when in a situation of serious deprivation or want incompatible with
human dignity.67
It is notable that while the case was brought under Article 2 ECHR by the
applicant, the Court made these statements in relation to Article 3. In its Kutepov
and Anikeyenko68 judgment, the Court elaborated further on the distinction
between Articles 2 and 3 in relation to destitution. Article 2 could in principle
be violated where the applicant ‘faces any real and immediate risk either to his
physical integrity or his life’,69 while Article 3 requires an indication ‘that the
amount of the second applicant’s pension has caused such damage to his physical or
mental health capable of attaining the minimum level of severity falling within the
ambit of Article 3 of the Convention’.70
There have been many arguments in legal scholarship that deprivation and
poverty could be viewed as violating Convention rights, and by extension, allow
the Court to set an objective minimum under which the state could not fall
without triggering international human rights protection. Judge Tulkens, for
instance, in discussing the role of the ECtHR during times of economic crisis,
argues in her extra-judicial writings that ‘[i]t would be unthinkable not to consider
that extreme poverty humiliates the individual in his own eyes and in the eyes of
others and is such as to arouse feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority’,71 thus
65 Ibid., at para. 3.
66 Application No 45603/05, 18 June 2009.
67 Budina, supra n. 10. Similar conclusions in relation to Arts 2 and 3 were reached in Pancenko v. Latvia
Application No 40772/98, Decision on the Admissibility, 28 Oct. 1999.
68 Kutepov and Anikeyenko v. Russia Application No 68029/01, Merits, 25 Oct. 2005.
69 Ibid., at para. 62.
70 Ibid. The claims brought under Arts 2 and 3 in this case of the Convention were found to be
manifestly ill-founded. The Court, however, did find a violation of Art. 1 P1.
71 Tulkens, Seminar to Mark the Opening of the Judicial Year of the European Court of Human Rights
(Strasbourg 25 Jan. 2013), para. 19, http://echr.coe.int/Documents/Speech_20130125_Tulkens_
ENG.pdf (accessed 1 Aug. 2018).
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engaging Article 3. While accepting that ‘almost as a matter of necessity, [there
must be] a certain degree of restraint in applying [this] in practice’,72 Tulkens
argues that ‘[i]s it really so ridiculous to think that if corporal punishment in
schools is considered to be degrading, the same should apply to the situation of
someone who “lives” in a slum?’73
The article argues that the Court has taken some steps towards the direction
that judge Tulkens describes, but the approach it followed is not entirely divorced
from a comparative/relative analysis of the impugned measure or the situation of
the applicant. However, these cases offer some guidance as to the factors that must
be present for the Court to find that the state can be held responsible for the
conditions of destitution the applicant is facing.
The first instance where the Court has found a violation of the ECHR
stemming from the state’s failure to provide welfare assistance, are cases where
the state’s intervention is indispensable for the protection of human life, and
essentially makes the difference between the ‘life and death’ of the applicant.
Here, exceptionally, the Court has found against the respondent state, but main-
tained a very high bar which is not easily applicable to broader instances of
destitution or to every person who is unable to sustain herself through state
providence or experiencing welfare reductions.74 Therefore, when basic social
policy is intrinsically tied to the protection of human life itself, the core of
Articles 2 and 3 is impinged, then there is an ‘objective’ responsibility of the
state to act by providing welfare, usually in the form of healthcare.
A further instance where the Court has required the state to proceed with
material provisions is where the applicant is deemed to belong to a vulnerable
group. The seminal case highlighting the Court’s approach in these circumstances
is M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece.75 The applicant was an asylum seeker who
complained inter alia, that upon his arrival to Greece, during the time his asylum
request was being considered, he was left without shelter and material provisions in
a state of destitution. The Court found that these conditions amounted to a
violation of the applicant’s Article 3 ECHR rights. While the case can be wel-
comed as a milestone in the Court’s case law on socio-economic obligations under
the Convention, its application beyond these very specific circumstances is
questionable.
72 Ibid., at para. 20.
73 Ibid.
74 Such examples are D v. United Kingdom Application No. 30240/96, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 2 May
1997; Paposhvili v. Belgium Application No. 41738/10, Merits and Just Satisfaction 13 Dec. 2016; Asiye
Genç v. Turkey Application No 24109/07, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 27 Jan. 2015.
75 Supra n. 18.
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This is principally due to the fact that when examining the state of destitution
of the applicant the primary justification the Court relied on to find a violation of
Article 3 ECHR, was obligations the respondent state had under its membership to
the European Union (EU). As the Court stressed:
Article 3 cannot be interpreted as obliging the High Contracting Parties to provide
everyone within their jurisdiction with a home. Nor does Article 3 entail any general
obligation to give refugees financial assistance to enable them to maintain a certain standard
of living. The obligation to provide accommodation and decent material conditions to
impoverished asylum-seekers has now entered into positive law and the Greek authorities
are bound to comply with their own legislation, which transposes Community law, namely
Council Directive 2003/9/EC laying down minimum standards for the reception of asylum-seekers
in the member States.76
The court’s reliance on the Council Directive in finding a violation of Article
3 is telling. The Court managed to uphold the applicant’s complaint but in essence
did nothing more than point to the more generous EU legal order to justify
bringing the provision of material assistance into the scope of the positive obliga-
tion under Article 3. This approach left the exact scope of Article 3 under the
circumstances unclear. Would these standards apply only to those contracting
parties to the ECHR that were bound by the EU council directive, or would
they also apply to the non-EU members of the ECHR?
It would be wrong, however, to underestimate the importance of the case
as a stepping stone towards a more robust use of Article 3 to tackle destitution.
Very importantly, in its reasoning, the Court made use of a secondary justifica-
tion for finding a violation of Article 3. The Court attached ‘considerable
importance to the applicant’s status as an asylum-seeker and, as such, a member
of a particularly underprivileged and vulnerable population group in need of
special protection’.77
The Court set out criteria for determining whether a group can be viewed as
vulnerable and in doing so referenced78 the Budina admissibility decision79 dis-
cussed above. According to the Court, such groups must be (1) fully dependent on
state support and (2) experience official indifference when in a situation of serious
deprivation or want incompatible with human dignity.80
76 Ibid., at paras 249 and 250, emphasis added.
77 Ibid., at para. 251, emphasis added.
78 Ibid., at para. 253.
79 Supra n. 10.
80 MSS, supra n. 18, at para. 263. See also Lourdes Peroni & Alexandra Timmer, Vulnerable Groups: The
Promise of an Emerging Concept in European Human Rights Convention Law, 11 Int’l J. Const. L. 1056–
1085 (2013).
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Relying on this basis, the Court stressed that:
In view of the obligations incumbent on the Greek authorities under the Reception
Directive [ … ], the Court considers that the Greek authorities have not had due regard
to the applicant’s vulnerability as an asylum-seeker and must be held responsible, because
of their inaction, for the situation in which he has found himself for several months, living
on the street, with no resources or access to sanitary facilities, and without any means of
providing for his essential needs.81
Thus, the lack of material provisions was once again, merely the starting point
in the Court’s ultimate finding that the state was in breach of its Convention
obligations. The applicant’s situation of destitution was supplemented by two
compounding factors, the obligation to provide assistance that arose from the
EU Directive, and the applicant’s membership to a vulnerable group. In subse-
quent case-law, the Court has found a violation relying on the applicants’ destitu-
tion and vulnerability alone, without recourse to EU law.82 Once again, however,
the applicants’ lack of access to basic provisions was supplemented by their
membership to a specific group to find a violation.83
The emergence of a vulnerability criterion to enhance the state’s positive
obligations towards specific groups can serve prima facie as a useful tool in
challenging a state’s austerity policy. Its application, however, is limited. The
applicant’s vulnerability in M.S.S. was not determined on the basis that he was
destitute, but on the basis that he was an asylum-seeker. Therefore, it would be
difficult to accept that this judgment generates an objective social minimum that
would apply to all instances of destitution caused by austerity measures. This aspect
of ‘group vulnerability’ also explains why this tool to enhance positive obligations
has been criticized. As commentators have pointed out, the term is exclusionary as
it suggests that individuals who are not readily identifiable as members of a
vulnerable group are viewed as ‘self-sufficient, independent and autonomous’.84
Furthermore, an approach that deploys the applicant’s vulnerability to justify
socioeconomic protection under the Convention, also to an extent relies on a
comparative and solidarity-based method of analysis. By designating certain groups
81 MSS, supra n. 18, at para. 263.
82 VM and others v. Belgium Application, supra n. 18. After the Chamber judgment was released, the case
was successfully referred to the Grand Chamber but was eventually struck out of the list for further
consideration due to the fact that ‘the applicant does not intend to pursue his application’. A Grand
Chamber judgment could have further clarified the relationship between vulnerability and destitution.
83 ‘Having regard to the foregoing, the Court considers that the situation experienced by the applicants
calls for the same conclusion as in the case of M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece. In the Court’s opinion, the
Belgian authorities did not duly take account of the vulnerability of the applicants as asylum-seekers or
of that of their children’. Ibid., at para. 162.
84 Peroni & Timmer, supra n. 80, at 1060.
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as vulnerable due to their experience, stigmatization or other characteristics,85 the
Court is suggesting that they are vulnerable in comparison to others, and therefore
in need of added protection under the Convention that may include the provision
of material assistance under Article 3 ECHR.86 The Court’s use of vulnerability, as
Peroni and Timmer explain,87 is thus one that is primarily driven by considerations
of substantive equality. In the context of a debt-ridden state therefore, even if a
reduction of social welfare across all affected parties would be considered fair from
the viewpoint of a formal understanding of equality, substantive equality as
evidenced through the Court’s use of the vulnerability criterion requires the
state to take a proactive stance and to ensure that any measures do not leave
vulnerable groups without any material assistance. Therefore, this approach once
again, rather than establishing an absolute, Convention-based social minimum
available to all, ties insufficiency of benefits to the comparative disadvantage of
the member of the vulnerable group to others.
4 UNLOCKING THE POTENTIAL OF THE ‘INSUFFICIENCY
OF BENEFITS’ STATEMENT: A MEANS OF ACHIEVING
SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE COST
OF AUSTERITY?
The discussion in the previous sections may be viewed as painting a particularly
disheartening picture of the Court’s capacity to demand from states a social
minimum of welfare protection that would be immune from austerity policies. It
also seems to suggest that obiter statements on insufficiency of benefits or sub-
sistence thresholds are misleading. If, as the article suggests, the Court relies on a
comparative method to identify whether the state has any socio-economic obliga-
tions towards the applicant and does not set an objective social minimum, is there
anything meaningful that this statement on insufficiency of benefits can contribute
to the ongoing discussion on austerity and Convention rights? In response to this
question, this section will argue that it would be incorrect to summarily discard
such statements as mere rhetorical flourishes. This part will argue that where
austerity has been evenly distributed, this statement can be useful in allowing the
Court, in an appropriate case, to ensure a distribution of the ‘cost’ of austerity that
85 See especially Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State, 60 Emory L.J.
251–275 (2010); Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human
Condition, 20 Yale J.L. & Feminism 1–23 (2008).
86 Art. 8 has also been used in conjunction with the vulnerability criterion to enhance state obligations to
ensure that the applicant does not become homeless. See Peroni & Timmer, supra n. 80.
87 Peroni & Timmer, supra n. 80, at 1076.
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goes beyond considerations of formal equality, to include an analysis of the
applicant’s situation from the perspective of substantive equality.88
In the austerity cases discussed, apart from the weight that was given to the
comparison between the applicant and others, the impact of the austerity measure to
the concrete situation of the applicant features as well, but not as prominently.
More specifically, in the admissibility decisions discussed in the article, the Court
stressed that the impact of the welfare cuts the applicants experienced would
arguably not affect their ability to sustain themselves.89 This could be taken to
suggest that the comparative approach the Court relies on (how does the welfare
reduction compare to other welfare reductions?) can be supplemented by a con-
crete examination of the impact of austerity to the individual (does the austerity
measure allow the individual to sustain themselves?). In the Asmundsson and NKM
judgments, where the respective applicants experienced disproportionate welfare
cuts, the manifestly excessive burden on the applicants sufficed to find violation.
Therefore, the Court did not discuss in depth whether the impact of the austerity
measure on the applicants could in itself render the state in breach of its
Convention obligations. The cases that have reached the Court are primarily
resolved on the basis of fairness and therefore, the Court has yet to fully engage
with a case where the distribution of austerity was fair, but the applicant90 was left
destitute. Consequently, it is unclear whether there is scope to suggest that a
reduction that is otherwise commensurate but leaves certain individuals destitute
due to their personal circumstances would violate the Convention.
The article submits that the ‘insufficiency of benefits’ statement, can be useful
in exactly such a scenario and that it can potentially contribute to further enhan-
cing an interpretation of the Convention that is more aimed towards achieving
substantive equality. It may allow Court in an appropriate case to focus more
squarely on the impact of the austerity measure to the applicant, if the welfare
reduction was ‘reasonable and commensurate’. The Court could find that the same
austerity measure may not affect everyone in the same way. Thus, a reduction in
welfare that is not excessive or discriminatory in terms of formal equality, may
have varying effects on different social welfare recipients. Thus, by featuring the
statement on insufficiency of welfare in its case-law, the Court would be able in an
appropriate case to challenge an austerity measure which does not create a dis-
proportionate burden, but, exceptionally, leaves someone without the means of
88 On the development of substantive equality in the ECtHR’s jurisprudence see Sandra Fredman,
Emerging from the Shadows: Substantive Equality and Article 14 of the European Convention on Human
Rights, 16 Human Rts. L. Rev. 273, 282 (2016); Joan Small, Structure and Substance: Developing a
Practical and Effective Prohibition on Discrimination under the European Convention on Human Rights, 6 Int’l
J. Discrimination & L. 45–68 (2003).
89 Koufaki, supra n. 29.
90 This would refer to an applicant who could not claim to be a member of a vulnerable group.
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subsistence. To illustrate this point more clearly by relying on a more practical
example, a fair and equitable reduction of 20% across all benefits may be experi-
enced differently by a self-sufficient individual without family responsibilities in
comparison to a single parent of three children who may be rendered destitute by
the exact same austerity measure. Here, the insufficiency of benefits criterion can
have a corrective role in ensuring that even in cases where the burden of austerity
was not excessive, the equitable distribution of austerity required the state to adopt
a more needs-based approach, rather than a strict formal equality approach. Thus,
even if the burden is not excessive in formal terms, the Court could rely on the
insufficiency of benefits to suggest that the state has further obligations towards the
applicant. This may allow the Court to adopt a more holistic examination of the
state’s role in protecting the applicant. Did the state take into account the needs of
the poorest when adopting austerity measures? Did it at least attempt to take
adequate countermeasures to alleviate the pain of those who would be most
directly affected? This potential of the insufficiency of benefits statement will yet
again rely on a comparative approach, but one that allows for considerations of
substantive equality to play a more forceful role.
This approach, however, still requires the existence of differentiating factors
between the applicant and others. In a hypothetical (and particularly bleak)
scenario where a debt-ridden state is unable to respond to its welfare obligations
and in a commensurate manner reduces welfare to a point where it wholly affects
the means of subsistence of the populace on a large scale, the applicant is unlikely
to succeed in gaining protection under the Convention. It would be more likely in
such circumstances for the Court to invoke the ‘proviso of possible’,91 rather than
to find the state in violation. As Feldman asserts, in relation to the Court’s socio-
economic jurisprudence, in such an unlikely situation where everyone is ‘equally
badly off’,92 than the state will have upheld its Convention obligations.
With these observations in mind, the following section will attempt to assess
why the Court relies on a comparative rather than an absolute approach.
5 THE RATIONALE OF SELECTING A COMPARATIVE/
RELATIONAL APPROACH
In attempting to identify the nature of the Court’s obiter statement on insuffi-
ciency of benefits, the article has identified an approach in the Court’s austerity
jurisprudence that allows it to subject an austerity measure to more intense
91 Supra n. 38.
92 Sandra Fredman, Human Rights Transformed: Positive Rights and Positive Duties 208 (Oxford University
Press 2008).
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scrutiny, in spite of the very wide margin of appreciation usually afforded to states
in relation to social welfare claims in times of crisis. By following a comparative or
relative approach when assessing the proportionality of an interference with Article
1 P1, the Court has found a violation where the applicants faced the ‘excessive
burden’ of being deprived of their social benefits, while others were left unaffected.
The Court in these cases assigned considerable weight to the fact that the ‘cost’ of
austerity was not distributed fairly amongst the populace. Conversely, no violation
was found where the applicant could not plausibly demonstrate that they were
unfairly singled out to suffer the consequences of austerity. The Court has also
relied on the vulnerability of applicants to find a failure of the state to provide them
with necessary material provisions, as a violation of Article 3. The justification in
this approach is similar, in that it identifies that the applicants are vulnerable in
comparison to others. This account therefore, is also premised on a comparative or
relative analysis. Furthermore, the article has suggested that the statement of
insufficiency of benefits has the potential to be deployed by the Court as a
means of working towards substantive equality in cases where the welfare reduc-
tion may seem commensurate, but in fact renders the individual destitute due to
their personal circumstances.
All these responses of the Court point towards an understanding of a social
minimum that is informed by notions of equality and solidarity rather than an
absolute approach that requires contracting parties to guarantee a Convention-
based minimum of social provisions. This section assesses the benefits of such a
comparative or relative approach. It argues that by examining austerity measures
through a comparative lens, the Court can claim ‘a seat at the table’ in the ongoing
discussion of austerity in Europe, by ensuring that states do not respond to a debt
crisis by arbitrarily sacrificing the welfare of a small group of individuals. At the
same time, this approach ensures that the Court is not overstepping its boundaries
by relying on an instrument protecting civil and political rights to generate
extensive and objective socioeconomic obligations on contracting parties.
Through a comparative approach, the Court’s demands from the state remain
subjective on the state and are tied to its specific capabilities. The state is still
expected to protect individuals from destitution during the crisis, but only insofar
as its means allow.93 However, any response must take into account considerations
of equal distribution of the weight of austerity.
This approach acknowledges the limits of international human rights super-
vision and recognizes that the obligations the Court can develop for states must not
93 In the context of socio-economic rights ‘a state is not required to take steps beyond what its available
resources permit. The implication is that more would be expected from high-income states than low
income states’ Manisuli Ssenyonjo, Economic Social and Cultural Rights in International Law 96 (Hart
2016).
554 EUROPEAN PUBLIC LAW
arbitrarily inflate the scope of the rights they have taken on to respect and protect
by signing and ratifying the Convention. Although, as discussed above, the Court
has endorsed the interdependence and indivisibility of rights,94 its approach is
characterized by caution. The Court clearly does not intend to create new and
possibly onerous socio-economic duties on states, especially when they are
attempting to recover from a crisis.
The comparative approach therefore, provides the Court with an avenue to
challenge an austerity measure, without directly having to assess the broader policy
choices of the state’s response to austerity. To illustrate how the Court achieves
this, it would be useful to examine how this comparison is carried out through a
more technical analysis of the Court’s inquiry into the compatibility of a welfare
reduction with the Convention under Article 1 P1. The comparative exercise
between the applicant and others is conducted in the proportionality (stricto sensu)
stage of the Court’s analysis, the stage where the Court assesses whether the
interference with a right was as extensive as was necessary in relation to the aim
the restriction was intended to achieve. In conducting this exercise under a
comparative approach, the Court is not directly challenging the economic neces-
sity of the austerity measure in isolation, namely it is not examining whether the
reduction in social welfare was in itself necessary to achieve the aim of protecting
public finances. This would have inevitably required the Court to engage in a
sensitive discussion on the allocation of scarce resources in the midst of a debt
crisis, an area that the Court has consistently held is outside its judicial domain.
Instead, the Court examines the necessity of selecting the specific individual (or
individuals) to bear the weight of austerity, while leaving others largely unaffected.
This slight shift on how the Court carries out the necessity test allows it to retain
some oversight over the state’s response to austerity, but also sets the limits as to
what the Court is willing to offer by means of Convention protection during the
crisis. This analysis, through which the Court assesses whether the austerity
measure creates an excessive burden, is therefore more akin to an implicit assess-
ment of discriminatory treatment of the applicant, rather than a balancing exercise
between the restriction to the applicant’s rights and the broader financial and
budgetary benefits that the restriction was designed to achieve. The Court, how-
ever, in the cases the article has examined that were brought against facing a debt
crisis, does not rely on the Convention’s non-discrimination provision to reach its
conclusions. Similarly, in Article 3 cases, where no balancing exercise is carried out
due to the absolute nature of the right, the Court focuses its efforts on determining
the vulnerability of the applicant rather than objectively establishing a social
minimum.
94 Supra n. 20 and n. 21.
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This raises a related issue. If in fact the Court through its discussion of fairness
in the distribution of the weight of austerity is seeking to ensure that the response
to the crisis does not result in discriminatory treatment of specific groups, does it
make a difference that the Court does not rely on Article 14 to achieve this, even
though in most challenges to austerity the article has discussed, the applicants
brought their claims under Article 14 in conjunction with other Convention
articles?95
In the cases examined, where there was a successful challenge to austerity, the
specific measures were so manifestly disproportionate that they could easily be
addressed through the proportionality assessment contained in Article 1 P1 taken
on its own.96 This is in line with the Court’s approach in the seminal Belgian
Linguistics97 judgment where the Court found that:
where a separate breach has been found of the substantive article, it is not generally
necessary … to consider the case under Article 14 also, though the position is otherwise
if a clear inequality of treatment in the enjoyment of the right in question is a fundamental
aspect of the case.98
By focusing on the substantive article to diagnose discriminatory treatment, the
Court is also relieved from the duty of having to follow the more structured test
that is dictated by Article 14 ECHR.99 By avoiding examination of this issue
through the lens of the discrimination provision, the Court is not required to
assess, for instance, whether the alleged reason for the discrimination was one of
the grounds listed in Article 14. The grounds of discrimination are not exhaustively
mentioned in the Convention. Article 14 provides that apart from the grounds
explicitly included in the Article, discrimination can be found in relation to any
95 See supra n. 44 and n. 49.
96 In the Asmundsson judgment (supra n. 44), after finding a violation of Art. 1 P1 and when proceeding
to examine the Art. 14 aspect of the claim, the Court noted that ‘no separate issue arises under Article
14 of the Convention and that, accordingly, it is unnecessary to examine the matter under these
provisions taken together’ at para. 47. Similarly, in NKM (supra n. 49) the Court held that ‘in the
circumstances of the present case, the Court is of the view that the inequality of treatment of which
the applicant claimed to be a victim has been sufficiently taken into account in the above assessment
that has led to the finding of a violation of Art. 1 of Protocol No. 1 taken separately. Accordingly, it
finds that – while this complaint is also admissible – there is no cause for a separate examination of the
same facts from the standpoint of Art. 14 of the Convention’ at para. 84.
97 Application Nos 1474/62; 1677/62; 1691/62; 1769/63; 1994/63; 2126/64, Merits and Just
Satisfaction, 23 July 1968.
98 D. J. Harris, Michael O’Boyle & Colin Warbrick, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights 784
(Oxford University Press 2014). The Court has on occasion examined Art. 14 separately after finding a
violation of Art. 1 P1, see for instance Chassagnou and others v. France Application No 25088/94 28331/
95, 28443/95, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 29 Apr. 1999.
99 The full test the Court applies in Art. 14 cases to determine is as follows: ‘Does the complaint of
discrimination fall within the scope of a protected right? Is the alleged reason for the discrimination
one of the grounds listed in Article 14? Can the applicants compare themselves with another class of
persons which is treated more favourably? Is the difference of treatment capable of objective and
reasonable justification?’ See Rainey, Wicks & Ovey, supra n. 19, at 567.
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‘other status’.100 The Court has relied on this to expand on the grounds enumer-
ated in Article 14.101 Perhaps, in the selected austerity cases coming from states in
the midst of a debt crisis, the Court is rightfully reluctant to inflate these grounds in
a manner that may significantly hamper the state’s ability to respond to the crisis.
The ‘excessive burden’ threshold for a measure to fail the Article 1 P1 proportion-
ality test is significantly higher than mere differential treatment to the enjoyment of
a right without reasonable justification that is required by Article 14. Thus, the test
of ‘excessive burden’ is one that is more difficult for the applicant to prove and
gives the state significant room for manoeuvre in differentiating its approach to
welfare cuts between various classes of individuals, as long as these welfare reduc-
tions do not excessively target one group, or leave certain persons destitute. The
approach would of course be different in circumstances where the ground for
differential treatment is a recognized ground in the Convention or the Court’s
case-law (for instance where austerity cuts were decided on the basis of gender), or
would relate to a fundamental aspect of the case as the court has alluded to in
Belgian Linguistics.102
In light of these observations, the article will offer some concluding thoughts.
6 CONCLUSION
The perceived failure of the Court to serve as a potent bulwark against austerity in
debt-ridden states is nothing more than a manifestation of its subsidiary nature as an
institution protecting human rights in Europe and of the limits of international
human rights supervision, especially where positive obligations and the allocation
of scarce resources are involved. While the Court has taken a more assertive stance
where applicants are singled out by legislative measures to carry the burden of
austerity in a discriminatory manner, if the distribution of the cost of austerity is
fair, the Court will struggle to find the normative justification that will allow it to
intervene and challenge a state’s austerity policy. Thus, an insufficiency of benefits
may only allow the court to examine whether the state has taken adequate steps, to
the best of its subjective abilities and based on the circumstances of the case, to
lighten the burden of those who will be most affected by ensuring that all
100 Gerards has highlighted the difficulties and discrepancies in the Court’s approach when expanding the
grounds of discrimination. The Court’s case-law is contradictory as to whether a ‘new’ ground can be
something other than a ground that relates to ‘personal choices or inherent personal traits’. See Janneke
Gerards, The Discrimination Grounds of Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights, 13 Human
Rts. L. Rev. 99, 108 (2013).
101 On this see Oddný Mjöll Arnardóttir, The Differences that Make a Difference: Recent Developments on the
Discrimination Grounds and the Margin of Appreciation under Article 14 of the European Convention on Human
Rights, 14 Human Rts. L. Rev. 647, 663 (2014).
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participate equally in austerity cuts. This, however, does not generate a pan-
European, Convention-based ‘social minimum’ of welfare protection. It does,
however, open up the possibility of requiring states to take into account matters
of substantive equality when passing austerity measures.
This approach serves as a reminder of the differences between the mandates of
the international and the domestic judge. Domestic judges on occasion have been
more accepting to the idea of tying destitution to violations of the Convention.103
The expectations, however, are different for the international judge whose man-
date is to examine the compatibility of state action (or inaction) with the ECHR.
As Jeff King argues, ‘attempts to leverage a comprehensive protection of social
rights out of an instrument that is chiefly aimed at protecting a class of civil and
political rights is not only undesirable, but irresponsible and undemocratic’.104 This
normative objection to the Court’s ability to establish a social minimum also seems
to be empirical reality.
The statement on insufficiency of benefits, however, is crucial to the Court’s
austerity case-law. An opposite pronouncement by the Court, suggesting that it
would never intervene to challenge austerity, should be dismissed as overly defer-
ential. Thus, in allowing itself the capacity to intervene in specific circumstances,
the Court could potentially be attempting to retain a ‘seat at the table’ in the
ongoing discussion of austerity in Europe. More specifically, it could be viewed as
sending a warning towards states, requiring them to ensure that, in the process of
negotiating conditionality agreements, any measures affecting social welfare do not
leave affected individuals destitute. Nonetheless, the justifications the Court will
have at its disposal for overriding the margin of appreciation in such cases to find a
violation of the Convention remain limited.
103 See for instance in the United Kingdom, R. (Adam and Limbuela) v. Secretary of State for the Home
Department [2005] UKHL 56; and at common law see indicatively The Queen On the Prosecution of the
Overseers of Saint Dionis, Backchurch v. The Inhabitants of Saint Leonard, Shoreditch (1865–66) L.R. 1 Q.B.
21; Katie Boyle, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Northern Ireland: Legitimate and Viable Justiciability
Mechanisms for a Conflicted Democracy, in Justiciability of Human Rights Law in Domestic Jurisdictions 173–
195 (Alice Diver & Jacinta Miller eds, Springer 2016).
104 Jeff King, Judging Social Rights 200 (Cambridge 2012).
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